Why are people antiscience, and what can we do about it?
Aviva Philipp-Muller, Spike W. S. Lee, and Richard E. Petty
Featured Article
How Politics Drive Antiscience Attitudes
Acceptance of scientific information is now sharply divided along political lines, with individuals in different camps holding, even enshrining, vastly different views (84). Conservatives are more likely than liberals to reject scientific evidence supporting evolution (85) and the existence of anthropogenic climate change (86), and have lower intentions to get vaccinated against COVID-19 (87). Although liberals, overall, are more inclined to accept scientific evidence (86–88), there are specific topics about which they are more likely to be skeptical, such as the risk of nanotechnology (35). How do we make sense of these political divides?
The literature on antiscience attitudes has found that rejection of scientific information by members of different political camps is often based on motivational factors (89). Building on these insights, we argue that politics can trigger or amplify basic mental processes across all four bases of antiscience attitudes, thereby making it a particularly potent force. Because the mental processes are not mutually exclusive, many of the political influences described below are likely to occur in conjunction with each other.
Politics impacts people’s perception of scientists’ credibility (the source) via perceived expertise and trustworthiness (90). In general, people see others with similar political views as more expert and knowledgeable. Both liberals and conservatives are less trusting of scientists whose work contradicts their ideological viewpoint (91), and recent exposures to such contradictory information reduces trust in the entire scientific community (92). Because liberals and conservatives find different sources credible (e.g., CNN vs. Fox News), they expose themselves to different scientific information (93) and misinformation (94), often reinforced by cues from trusted political elites (95), further entrenching them in siloed networks. In the era of social media and algorithmically customized news feeds, even what appears to be the same source (e.g., Facebook) can provide highly varied information to different users (96), exacerbating the division of communities along political lines.
For many, politics is more than just a set of beliefs or ideals; it is a core part of their identity (97), which can have a large impact on how they, as a recipient, react to different pieces of scientific evidence, policy proposals, and legislation. Those who identify strongly as a Democrat or a Republican tend to show different responses to various pieces of scientific information, with each group rejecting proposals that are purportedly proposed by the outgroup, even when it goes against their own best interest. For example, when carbon taxes are framed as being a predominantly Republican (vs. Democrat) policy, those who identify as Democrat (vs. Republican) are more likely to oppose the policy (96). This opposition to anything proposed by the outgroup is mediated by the perception that the outgroup is a threat to society (99), and threats reliably trigger outgroup antipathy (100). Such antipathy is prevalent in the political sectarianism of our time (101), which leads many individuals to selectively expose themselves to congenial scientific information (28).
Indeed, people have a strong tendency to seek out information (the message) that reinforces their existing beliefs (93), a phenomenon intensified by online platforms, which heighten the speed and scope of exposure to information and misinformation in homogenous and polarized echo chambers (102). Much of the misinformation online is politically charged, covering diverse topics from elections to climate change (57). Research on values-based messaging has found that, when a political message evokes values discordant with people’s existing values, it tends to be rejected (103). Indeed, when scientific information contradicts people’s beliefs shaped by political forces, it tends to be rejected outright as simply untrue, a tendency exhibited by both liberals and conservatives (104). Worse still, the more extreme or morally charged people’s political views, the stronger their sense of belief superiority, regardless of accuracy (105), further amplifying the rejection of belief-contradictory scientific information.
Alongside content differences (the types of messages liberals and conservatives seek out and accept), liberals and conservatives also differ in how they approach information (epistemic styles). Conservatives are, on average, more prevention focused, and liberals are more promotion focused (106). According to this logic, conservatives would be more likely to reject scientific information framed as approaching gains, and liberals would be more likely to reject scientific information framed as avoiding losses. Conservatives also have a stronger need for closure (107), which is linked to stronger beliefs in a variety of conspiracy theories with no scientific basis (108).
Altogether, politics is a particularly potent force in rejection of scientific information because it strikes all four bases of antiscience attitudes, at times amplifying them. Acute increases in political partisanship and sectarianism (101) in recent years have only accentuated the potency and toxicity of such political influences.
Construal level, regulatory focus, need for closure, and need for cognition are different dimensions of epistemic style. On any of these dimensions, a mismatch between how scientific information is delivered and how the recipient thinks will increase the probability of rejection. More generally, source–recipient mismatches (basis 4), content conflicts (basis 3), social identity (basis 2), and sources lacking in credibility (basis 1) all contribute to antiscience attitudes. They also point to why politics is a particularly potent driver of these attitudes.
‡ An individual's habitual or favored process of making a judgment or solving a problem.
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